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Abstract 
Innovative firms face two major kinds of risks in developing new technologies: 
competence destruction and appropriability. High levels of technical uncertainty 
and radical changes in knowledge in some fields generate high technical failure 
risks and make it difficult to plan research and development programmes. They 
therefore encourage high levels of flexibility in acquiring and using skilled staff. 
Appropriability risks, on the other hand, encourage innovative firms to develop 
organisation-specific competences through investing in complementary assets, 
such as marketing and distribution capabilities, that involve longer-term 
employer-employee commitments to building complex organisations. These 
connections between technology risks and employment policies help to explain 
why different kinds of market economies with contrasting labour market 
institutions develop varied innovation patterns. 
 
In particular, subsectors of the computer software and biotechnology industries 
that vary in their level of technical change and appropriability have developed 
in contrasting ways in three European countries that have quite distinct 
institutional frameworks: Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
Institutions in the UK are similar in key respects to those in the USA that 
encourage the development of “radically innovative” firm competences. As a 
result, a considerable number of biotechnology firms specialising in the 
development of therapeutic products and companies producing standard 
software have become established there. In Germany, on the other hand, 
institutional frameworks associated with competence enhancing human resource 
practices give its firms an advantage in more cumulative and generic 
technologies developed by more complex organisations. Consequently, more 
platform biotechnology and enterprise software firms have developed in that 
country. Labour market institutions in Sweden resemble those in Germany in 
many respects, and so too does the pattern of biotechnology development. 
However, because of the changing role of Ericsson and other factors, more 
firms engaged in highly risky middleware and standard software development 
have become established there.  
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Introduction 
Recent studies of sectoral specialisation and technological 
development across market economies have shown how contrasting 
patterns of technical change can be explained by the different 
institutional frameworks that have become established in distinct 
types of economy (see, e.g., Casper, 2000; Casper et al., 1999; 
Soskice, 1997; 1999). According to the "varieties of capitalism" 
framework, “liberal market economies” (LMEs) such as the US and 
the UK excel in developing the necessary competencies to innovate in 
industries dominated by rapidly emerging technologies.  More 
organised or “coordinated market economies” (CMEs) like Germany, 
by contrast, have developed institutions that advantage long-term and 
incremental innovation strategies, but inhibit more radical innovation 
paths (Hall and Soskice, 2001; compare Nooteboom, 2000; Whitley, 
2000; 2002).  A key assertion of this view is that national patterns of 
specialisation are created by comparative institutional advantages in 
governing the organizational competences needed to innovate within 
particular technological fields.     
 
Such contrasts help to identify core differences between advanced 
industrial economies, but tend to underestimate the adaptiveness of 
firms within an economy and important differences between sub-
sectors. These help to explain a number of features of some European 
economies in the 1990s that appear anomalous from a simple 
interpretation of the varieties of capitalism approach. For example, 
while the dichotomy of exit and voice forms of capitalism suggests 
that there should be virtually no entrepreneurial technology firms 
within “coordinated market economies” such as Germany or Sweden, 
and the liberal market economies like the UK should have a 
comparative institutional advantage in producing radically innovative 
technology firms, entrepreneurial technology firms appear to be 
thriving in many areas of Continental Europe, and the performance of 
UK firms has been relatively poor in some sub-sectors of the 
biotechnology and software industries.  




In order to explain such phenomena and identify how institutional 
frameworks generate distinctive strategies and organisational 
capabilities in more detail, we need to link institutional arrangements 
to the ways that companies develop different kinds of technologies in 
emerging industries at the subsectoral level. In this paper we consider 
the various sorts of problems that firms have to manage in developing 
new technologies in different sub-sectors of the biotechnology and 
software industries, and how particular institutional frameworks in 
Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom affect their strategies.   
We suggest that the core issues faced by entrepreneurial technology 
firms – developing skills, managing hiring and sometimes firing 
personnel, and coordinating technology development with external 
actors – are strongly influenced by the skill formation and labour 
market institutions within these economies.   
 
While liberal market economies such as the US or UK do have 
institutional arrangements that are conducive to the development of 
project-based entrepreneurial technology start-ups focusing on 
discontinuous radical innovations, there are other subsectors of 
emerging industries where more complex and stable organisations are 
effective. Success in such segments is strongly advantaged by 
institutional structures that create competence enhancing human 
resource structures.  Coordinated market economies such as Germany 
and Sweden have superior institutional frameworks to govern these 
kinds of such collaborative enterprises and have emerged as leaders 
within Europe in developing them. However, in the case of the 
development of middleware software in Sweden, a sub-sector in 
which external coordination across firms is important, the activities of 
large firms appear to have altered “normal” institutional incentives. 
As a result, large numbers of software firms with high levels of 
technical intensity have become established there.  
 
We discuss this case in some detail in the last section of this paper. 
The first section focuses on two key issues faced by entrepreneurial 
technology firms in different subsectors of the computer software and 
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biotechnology industries, while the second suggests how these are 
connected to varied institutional arrangements. The third section 
provides evidence on patterns of specialisation across different sub-
sectors of the software and biotechnology industries within Germany, 
Sweden, and the UK, while the fourth considers the German case in 
more detail. Finally, we examine the development of middleware 
software firms in Sweden. 
 
Key Management Issues Facing Entrepreneurial Technology 
Firms 
In seeking to explain variations in patterns of development of 
entrepreneurial technology companies in different subsectors, it is 
useful to distinguish two kinds of technological risks that affect 
managerial priorities (Malerba and Orsenigo, 1993; Breschi and 
Malerba, 1997; Dosi, 1988). First, appropriability risks reflect the 
ease with which competitors can imitate innovations. They are 
typically managed through patent and copyright protection or through 
controlling complementary assets, as discussed by Teece (1986). In 
the pharmaceutical industry, for example, patent protection is 
relatively effective because minor changes in the structure of 
therapeutic drugs can have major consequences for their operation in 
the human body (Gambardella, 1995). As a result, drug discovery 
firms are able to specialise in highly risky activities without needing 
to develop complementary assets to protect their innovations. 
 
Second, competence destruction risks reflect the volatility and 
uncertainty of technical development that vary greatly between 
technologies, both in terms of the technological trajectories being 
followed and market acceptance. Where technological uncertainty is 
high, it is difficult to predict which investments and skills will be 
effective and firms have to be able to change direction at short notice. 
Consequently, the managers of radically innovative firms are faced 
with the need to attract and motivate expert staff to work on complex 
problems when unpredictable outcomes may involve dismissal and/or 
organizational failure. 
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To offset high technical or market uncertainty, most firms competing 
to create radical innovations in markets where winners of innovation 
races can expect to capture a relatively large share of emerging 
markets focus on technology areas in which appropriability regimes 
through copyright and patent protection are quite strong.  When 
appropriability risks are relatively low because standard forms of 
intellectual property protection are sufficient to guard technical 
innovations from being copied, management can focus primarily on 
R&D activities. This minimises organizational complexity, allowing a 
relatively coherent focus on core milestones needed to develop a new 
product or technology.  Such radically innovative firms are typically 
project-based organizations.  Managers here organise highly skilled 
staff into a series of teams focused on solving complex problems 
under very tight time constraints. They often employ performance 
based incentive schemes and employee ownership plans to induce 
employees to commit to solve organisational problems in these 
intense work environments. The prospect of large financial rewards 
encourages the alignment of the private incentives of highly skilled 
employees with those of commercial managers/owners.     
 
These two kinds of technological risk tend, then, to be inversely 
related. Investments in developing highly uncertain technologies are 
usually undertaken when appropriability risks are limited, while firms 
developing innovations that are more open to such risks tend to focus 
on more cumulative and predictable technologies. Companies racing 
to produce highly radical, discontinuous innovations have to be 
flexible in their use of key resources such as highly expert 
technologists and in changing direction, while those developing more 
imitable technologies have to acquire complementary competences 
and integrate them through organisational routines. They therefore are 
more organisationally complex than radically innovative companies. 
 
Considering first the key issues faced by innovative firms in 
subsectors that combine high levels of technical uncertainty with low 
appropriability risks, managers here need to be able to change 
research and development competences quickly.  To do this, they 
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need access to a pool of scientists, technicians, and other specialists 
with known reputations in particular areas that can quickly be 
recruited to work on projects (see Bahami and Evans, 1995).   If there 
is a cultural stigma attached to failing or changing jobs regularly, then 
engineers and managers may choose not to join firms with high-risk 
research projects, for fear that if the project fails the value of his or 
her engineering and/or management experiences could significantly 
decline.  Furthermore, high levels of competence destruction create 
knowledge investment problems. Employees have an incentive not to 
invest in large amounts of firm-specific knowledge, such as 
proprietary software languages, when there is a strong probability that 
their employment tenure at the firm will be low (or that the firm could 
quickly fail).   
 
The resolution of these kinds of management problems is greatly 
facilitated by the establishment of  strong technical communities – 
networks of engineers, scientists, or software developers with 
common skill-sets, shared industry experienced, and a high amount of 
personal contact - in particular regions such as Silicon Valley 
(Saxenian, 1994; Kenney, 2000).  Tapping into these communities 
can help firms reduce competency destruction risks while, for 
technical personnel, membership can reduce career risks created by 
working within risky technologies.  
 
These kinds of project-based firms (Whitley, 2002) are widespread in 
many sub-sectors of the biotechnology and computer software 
industries.  One such sub-sector is standard (or application-based) 
software created for large homogenous markets where demand for 
customisation is low. Examples include graphic application software 
(e.g. CAD/CAM), multimedia and computer entertainment software, 
and a variety of application software used to run computer networks 
(e.g. e-mail, FTP, groupware, and document management programs).  
Most companies developing such standard software are project-based 
firms with relatively simple organizational structures.   
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Low customisation and high scale economies here lead to intense 
competitive races to establish dominant designs and introduce new 
features (or “functionality”) to software products through periodic 
upgrades.  Such competition creates high competence destruction 
within the software industry and the failure of small development 
houses. Since it is relatively easy to protect standard software 
products through a combination of: a) patent/copyright protection, b) 
secrecy over a program’s so-called source-code, or c) “lock-in” 
effects once a product becomes successful and a customer base 
develops (see Shapiro and Varian, 1999), these firms do not usually 
need to integrate R&D with other activities.  Knowledge properties 
across standard software firms are relatively standardised or industry-
specific.  While software developers and engineers working within the 
firm often have advanced graduate training, their skill-sets are 
relatively generic across employers and customers, including 
industry-wide computer languages and analytical training.   
 
Therapeutics based biotechnology is a second common example of a 
sub-sector populated by radically innovative technology start-ups.  A 
defining feature of therapeutics research is its very high scientific 
intensity in the sense of being closely dependent upon new scientific 
knowledge of generic biological phenomena and processes.  Firms 
often are constituted on the basis of theoretical expertise pertaining to 
particular biomedical research areas, and then develop or acquire any 
number of particular application technologies needed to pursue 
projects as research progresses.  Uncertainty regarding the success of 
basic scientific research creates relatively high technological volatility 
for start-up therapeutic firms.   
 
Ethnographic accounts consistently document the widely changing 
course of therapeutic firm research activities over time, which often 
leads to repeated changes in the competence structure of the firm (see, 
e.g., Werth, 1993, Rabinow, 1996).  More generally, failure rates are 
high and time horizons are relatively long throughout the drug 
development process (Henderson et. al. 1999).   A recent study of 
research dynamics within the area of Alzheimer's disease, for 
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example, noted over twenty discrete networks of firm/lab 
combinations conducting competitive research (Pennan, 1996).   
 
A final example of a radically innovative sub-sector is middleware 
software. Firms in this market compete to develop new interface 
technologies that are used to link the basic architecture of 
communication networks to standard application software.  Typical 
middleware products include secure payment systems used in internet 
banking and e-commerce, software that transforms the content of web 
servers into a format that can be used in small mobile telephones or 
Palm Pilot devices, and search engines that are used for navigation on 
the World Wide Web. Most firms in middleware software race to 
create new technologies with superior functionality or speed to 
market.   
 
However, in comparison with standard software and therapeutics-
based biotechnology firms they have to deal with an additional 
coordination problem.  Because successful innovations in this sub-
sector are developed with a variety of different kinds of knowledge 
that are interdependent, technical standards, design interfaces and 
other product architecture related issues have to be integrated if firms 
are to have a high probability of success (see generally Perrow, 1985; 
Kitschelt, 1991). For middleware firms, low technological 
cumulativeness and the need for coordination across groups of firms 
in complementary markets create high standards related risks (Arthur, 
1994).  Firms that cannot successfully coordinate technical 
specifications or designs with other firms in a technology area, or join 
unsuccessful design or standard families, will fail.    
 
Turning now to consider firms operating in subsectors that combine 
lower levels of technological uncertainty with greater appropriability 
risks, they are likely to attempt to integrate new technologies with 
other assets that generate firm-specific advantages (Teece, 1986). For 
example, companies facing appropriability risks often develop 
specialised assets in sales, distribution or a variety of technical 
implementation and consulting activities that are relatively customer-
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specific. Development work therefore becomes more complex, 
involving cross-functional team-organised projects in which R&D 
personnel work with consultants, marketing personnel, and 
implementation technicians to customise technology platforms for 
clients. In these kinds of sub-sectors firms attempt to develop learning 
economies or create tacit knowledge embedded within project teams 
that are difficult for other firms to mimic.   
 
These kinds of collaborative firms coordinate more varied skills and 
activities through the managerial authority hierarchy than most 
project-based firms and this coordination often generates firm-specific 
knowledge and routines. Such organisational complexity affects 
employment policies. For example, when structures are relatively 
simple – as in the case of most R&D focused firms - straightforward 
and relatively short-term (and renewable) employment contracts are 
often adequate.  Furthermore, low levels of organisational complexity 
reduce the likelihood that cross-functional teams will form and create 
firm-specific knowledge.  Such simple organizational forms are 
associated, then, with relatively generic knowledge development that 
can be easily codified.  This means that individual employees are less 
able to “hold up” the firm and management can develop relatively 
flexible human resource strategies.   
 
More complex relationships between employers and employees exist 
when firms develop distinctive competences through the integration 
and enhancement of varied knowledge and skills.  Employment 
relationships are here often characterised by incomplete, long-term 
employment contracts due to the existence of considerable tacit and 
often firm-specific knowledge developed across functional teams 
within the firm (see generally Miller, 1992).  Though generic industry 
skills may be used to create and update these technologies, some skills 
or routines become specific to the firm (Winter, 1987).  Proprietary 
and team-based work organization is here likely to lead to the creation 
of firm specific skills.   
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Such firm-specific knowledge is valuable to the firm, but hard to sell 
on open labour markets or markets for technology.  Firm-specific 
knowledge investments, once made, could lead to opportunistic 
demands by employers.  Employees might hesitate making such 
knowledge investments without a credible commitment from 
management that they will not be exploited.  Moreover, tacit 
knowledge can easily lead to information asymmetries between the 
management and employees of a firm, creating potential difficulties 
for management to monitor and appropriately reward work, 
particularly across members of project teams.   
 
As a result, the management of skilled staff in such situations 
involves quite different issues from those faced by project-based 
firms.   When organizational complexity is high, managers need to 
encourage employees to collaborate in developing organisation-
specific capabilities, often through long-term employment and 
generally consultative work place arrangements, in order to exploit 
tacit knowledge within the firm. They are compelled to create 
“credible commitments” not to act opportunistically after sunk-cost 
skill investments have been made (Miller, 1992). Once such 
commitments become credible, for example through the creation of 
reputations for being stable employers or the creation of 
“constitutional” limits on the management of the firm, risky 
employment contracts can become viable.  While the development of 
corporate cultures is crucial to the success of particular firms, firm-
specific commitment strategies have a relatively long time-horizon 
that could prove difficult for entrepreneurial technology firms to 
implement effectively, especially during the start-up phase.   
 
These kinds of competence enhancing human resource policies are far 
more feasible when clusters of firms within a shared technology and 
labour market develop complementary patterns of human resource 
development.   If cultural norms within a local labour market or, more 
likely, institutional structures such as legal constraints on hiring and 
firing, exist, then the expectations of scientists, engineers, and 
technicians will be towards long-term employment and generally 
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consultative workplaces, leading to the rapid formation of complex 
organizational structures and associated knowledge investment 
patterns within groups of entrepreneurial start-ups.  As in the case of 
competence destroying technologies, for these human resource 
strategies to be viable most firms within a local labour market must 
adopt similar strategies.  If employee poaching, for example, is an 
accepted and common practice within a community of firms, then 
employees will naturally gravitate towards skill development 
strategies centred on generic and codified skills that are easily 
saleable on such labour markets.  
 
Entrepreneurial firms in two sub-sectors of the software and 
biotechnology industries, enterprise software and platform 
biotechnologies, exemplify this constellation of organizational 
competences.   In contrast to standard software, enterprise software 
consists of software platforms or modules that are extensively 
customised for individual clients.  Firms in this category include those 
developing enterprise resource planning (ERP), customer relationship 
management (CRM), groupware and systems integration products as 
well as a number of firms creating sector-specific enterprise tools (e.g. 
logistics and supply chain management tools).   
 
Companies developing platform biotechnologies share a similar 
pattern of business organization.  They create enabling technologies 
that are sold to other research labs.  Products include consumable kits 
used to rationalise common molecular biology lab processes, such as 
the purification of DNA and other important molecules.  Platform 
technology firms have also developed a number of engineering and 
information technology based applications that have been used to 
automate many aspects of the discovery process within therapeutics.  
These include extremely high throughput “combinatorial chemistry” 
applications to aid the screening of potential therapeutic compounds 
and the development of genetic sequencing and modelling techniques. 
 
Firms in both enterprise software and platform technology share 
similar patterns of industrial organization.  Technologies in each 
  10 
 
  
segment tend to be generic with high appropriability risks.  As a 
result, entry is relatively easy, and dozens of firms exist in most 
enterprise software and platform biotechnology segments.  Highly 
competitive enterprise software markets include enterprise resource 
planning and, more recently, Internet software to run e-commerce.   
Numerous firms also compete in most platform technology markets, 
such as nucleic acid filtration or amplification (PCR) or information 
technology rich areas such as DNA sequencing and bioinformatics.  
In these markets, successful firms generally create complementary 
organizational capabilities that can be protected by the firm.  These 
usually include assets needed to customise general technology 
platforms for specialised product niches.  Doing so creates larger, 
more complex organizational structures than those seen at 
entrepreneurial technology firms focused more on the management of 
competence destruction risks.   
 
Institutional Frameworks and Competence Development in 
Entrepreneurial Technology Firms 
The ways that managers deal with these problems in entrepreneurial 
technology firms vary between market economies with different 
institutional frameworks (Whitley, 2000; 2002). The preceding 
analysis suggests that project-based entrepreneurial technology firms 
faced with high competence destruction risks develop quite different 
managerial practices to those adopted by more collaborative firms 
attempting to govern complex organizational structures.  These latter 
companies encourage competence-enhancing patterns of work 
organization, while “hire and fire” is a virtual prerequisite for firms 
facing competence destruction. These different kinds of practices are 
greatly influenced by the skill formation and labour market 
institutions of different countries, in addition to their financial and 
political systems, as can be illustrated by contrasting coordinated and 
liberal market economies (Hall and Soskice, 2001; compare Whitley, 
1999). 
 
Coordinated market economies typically display quite high levels of 
non-market coordination through credit-based finance, strong 
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business associations and state supported technical standards setting 
and technical development. Some have formally regulated labour 
markets with legally-binding wage bargaining between unions and 
industry associations for most skilled workers, organised 
apprenticeship based systems of technical training, and regulative 
patterns of company and corporate law that grant unions a strong say 
in corporate governance.   
 
Institutional frameworks within CMEs strongly favour the 
development of managerial commitments needed for employees to 
willingly make firm-specific knowledge investments that are not 
easily saleable on open labour markets.  Such arrangements tend to 
“lock-in” owners, managers, and skilled employees into long-term, 
organised relationships.  Strong norms and legal obstacles to “hire and 
fire” combined with a long-standing tradition, buffered by co-
determination laws, of consultative patterns of work organization, 
favour competence enhancing human resource policies.  As Streeck 
(1984) has argued with respect to Germany, within CMEs 
management must treat employees as “fixed” rather than “variable 
costs”, and as a result have a strong interest in developing long-term 
career structures for all skilled employees within the firm.   
 
In terms of encouraging different kinds of entrepreneurial technology 
firms, this analysis suggests that CMEs have a comparative 
institutional advantage in creating clusters of organisationally 
complex collaborative firms developing firm-specific competences in 
cumulative technologies. In contrast, they have a comparative 
institutional disadvantage in the governance of radically innovative 
project-based firms focused on developing competence-destroying 
technologies with high failure risks.   
 
In contrast to CMEs, liberal market economies tend to develop far 
more market-based forms of industry coordination, generally 
supported by less government regulation, particularly within labour 
markets.  Typical institutions in LMEs include primarily capital 
market based finance, deregulated labour markets with a relatively 
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low amount of legal support for institutionalised wage bargaining 
between unions and company associations, and patterns of company 
and corporate law that favour shareholders when making most 
corporate governance decisions.   
 
Companies embracing this system face far less institutionalised “lock-
in” regarding employees or other stakeholders to the company.  Hire-
and-fire, when embraced by most companies within a sector, can be 
used to create large external labour markets for most skills. On the 
other hand, employees facing this pattern of labour market 
organization will be extremely reluctant to develop patterns of firm-
specific skill development needed to support entrepreneurial strategies 
relying on the development of high organizational complexity.  This 
discussion suggests that LMEs have a comparative institutional 
advantage in creating clusters of radically innovative project-based 
firms, but, on the other hand, have a comparative institutional 
disadvantage in the governance of entrepreneurial firms where 
organizational complexity is high.  
 
In the light of this analysis we now examine the performance of three 
European economies in three radically innovative sub-sectors 
(standard software, therapeutics biotechnology, middleware software) 
and two organisationally complex subsectors (enterprise software, and 
platform biotechnologies). Two economies are governed by 
institutions that encourage high levels of economic coordination, 
Germany and Sweden, while the third, the United Kingdom, most 
resembles the liberal market economy.  
 
Germany and Sweden are paradigmatic examples of coordinated 
political economies (for a good comparison of the two countries see 
Thelen, 1993; for Germany see Katzenstein, 1989; for Sweden see 
Pontusson and Swenson, 1996).   Within both countries non-market 
forms of business coordination are facilitated by the embeddedness of 
large firms within networks of powerful trade and industry 
associations, as well as a similar, often legally mandated, organization 
of labour and other interest organizations within para-public 
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institutions (Katzenstein, 1989).  Businesses and other social actors 
engage in these associations to create important non-market collective 
goods, such as the apprenticeship system or network of collaborative 
technology transfer institutes.   
 
Public policy in both countries focuses on neo-corporatist bargaining 
environments through the legal delegation of specific bargaining 
rights to unions and other stakeholders within firms (see Streeck, 
1984).  Strong codetermination laws empower unions and other 
stakeholders to bargain the terms of industrial change with employer 
associations.  Some differences exist across Sweden and Germany.  
For example, Sweden’s collective bargaining system is far more 
centralised than Germany’s more decentralised model focused on 
federal Laender (Thelen, 1997). Similarly, employers associations and 
unions, as well as training programmes, are more sectorally organised 
in Germany than in Sweden. Nonetheless, industrial relations in both 
countries lock managers and employees into long-term relationships, 
promoting competence enhancing human resource development 
within firms.  These institutions should advantage the governance of 
organisationally complex collaborative firms. 
 
In strong contrast, the UK has developed largely LME institutions 
(see Hall and Soskice, 2001; Wood 2001; King and Wood, 1999).  
The financial system is strongly capital market based, with total 
market capitalization as a percentage of GDP at the end of 1997 at 
151% exceeding the United States (121%) and far ahead of 
Germany’s still predominately bank-centred system (26%) (Deutsche 
Bundesbank,  1998).  Financial and labour markets are largely 
deregulated, facilitating “hire and fire”, while corporate law is 
primarily enabling in nature and focused on shareholder primacy (see 
Monks and Minow, 1995).  Particularly through the 1980s and 90s, 
the UK dramatically deregulated markets and weakened the power of 
collective actors within society, above all unions.  This liberal market 
orientation should encourage the development of radically innovative 
project-based firms.    
 
  14 
 
  
Given our characterisation of the five technologically dynamic 
subsectors we would expect the success of project-based and 
collaborative entrepreneurial technology firms in each to vary 
considerably between in Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
In particular, while the first two countries should evince greater 
success in platform biotechnology and enterprise software, they are 
likely to be less successful in the other three subsectors. These 
expectations are summarised in table 1. 
 
Sub-sectoral Distribution of Biotechnology and Software 
Companies in Germany, Sweden and the UK 
To assess the validity of these expectations we examined the 
distribution of publicly quoted companies in the biotechnology and 
software industries in these three countries in terms of their 
preponderance in subsectors with different kinds of technological 
risks. While the subsectoral specialisation of these firms does not 
necessarily reflect only national economic performance in new 
industries, they performed well enough during their initial, usually 
venture capital financed stages for investment banks and private 
investors to invest in their further growth through initial public 
offerings on the stock market.  If a country has a high number of 
public firms specialised in a particular sub-sector this is a good 
indicator that competences associated with that sub-sector can be 
efficiently governed within the country’s institutional frameworks. 
 
The primary business of each company was classified through an 
analysis of their web pages.  We also drew upon company summaries 
and sub-sector classifications published on the Internet by financial 
service companies such as Hoovers On-line and Wright Investment 
Analysis to verify our classifications.   
All biotechnology and software firms listed on technology-oriented 
stock markets in the UK, Germany, and Sweden were included. As 
our theoretical analysis rests largely on nation-specific institutional 
effects on the organization of firms, we checked to ensure that all 
companies included in our analysis had corporate headquarters in 
Germany, Sweden, or the UK.  This led to the removal of three 
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companies listed on the German Neuer Markt that had headquarters 
outside Germany.  
 
For many biotechnology companies determining whether the primary 
orientation was towards development of platform technology or 
therapeutic products was simple.  Therapeutic companies presented 
themselves as specialists within particular therapeutic areas, such as 
immunology or cardiovascular diseases, and had extensive internal 
expertise in disease-specific areas.  Platform technology companies 
focused extensively on their technological competencies that are 
usually presented as applicable across a wide array of therapeutic 
research areas.   
 
However, some companies, particularly in the genomics area, develop 
technology platforms that can then be used to generate therapeutic 
targets (so-called “gene to lead” strategies).  For these companies, we 
examined whether the primary technological orientation was towards 
the improvement of the technological platform and its licensing to 
other firms, or towards in-house therapeutic development.  A good 
indicator of this is the stage of development by which in-house 
therapeutic candidates are sold to pharmaceutical companies.  In 
contrast to therapeutics-based firms, most platform technology 
companies sell candidate compounds they have discovered at a very 
early stage of their development, choosing to invest little or no funds 
into in-house expertise within particular therapeutic disease areas or 
competences in pre-clinical trials.   
 
A second problem, found with several UK biotechnology companies, 
is an orientation towards what could be labelled “radically 
innovative” product innovations that could be sold to mass markets 
with relatively little customisation.  Nine of the UK firms were 
specialised in drug-delivery products.  Examples include powder-
based injection devices that remove the need for needles, dermal 
patch technologies, and compounds used to shield drugs taken orally 
from strong acids contained in the stomach.  While sometimes 
classified as platform biotechnologies, the drug delivery segment 
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shares strong characteristics with “radically innovative” firms.  In 
each of these areas, competition across firms largely rests on the basis 
of creating major new technological innovations aimed at capturing 
large market shares for firms.  We decided to classify these companies 
within our project-based firm category, which was then renamed 
“therapeutics and product based biotechnologies.”  Diagnostic 
products were also included in this category. 
 
Classifying the software firms was in most cases straightforward.   
Middleware software firms usually identified themselves by this 
product category, and were focused on the development of software to 
improve to aid the efficiency by which different computing systems 
interfaced within communications networks.  To differentiate standard 
and enterprise software vendors we focused first on well known 
standard and enterprise software categories (e.g. enterprise resource 
planning (ERP) and customer relationship management (CRM) 
products are well-known enterprise software segments, while multi-
media, entertainment, and graphics software are well-known standard 
software segments).   
 
For all other firms, we examined the degree by which the company 
offers to customise its software for clients.  Companies offering 
extensive consulting, implementation, or systems integration services 
were classified as enterprise software firms.  Standard software 
companies, on the other hand, generally licensed software “as is” to 
clients and do not engage in extensive consultancy-related services. 
These classifications were, when possible, verified by gathering data 
on the percentage of a company’s earnings generated through 
software licensing, which is high for most standard software 
companies and low for enterprise software vendors (available for 
about half the firms in our database). 
 
While for most cases sub-sectoral classification was not difficult, the 
problem with investigator bias remains inherent in this type of 
analysis.  Future research could reduce it through identifying 
structural characteristics of firms within particular sub-sectors that 
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could be captured through more quantitative data (see Casper and 
Vitols, 2002).  As our purpose within the present analysis is to capture 
broad trends at a macro-level, the more puzzling or interesting of 
which can then be explored in more detail, we believe simple 
investigator-led classifications are sufficient.  Furthermore, adopting a 
multiple-methodology approach should help minimise the bias and 
classification error issues; supplementary data will be used to verify 
these macro-results for some cases. 
 
Considering first the distribution of biotechnology firms in Germany, 
Sweden and the UK, summarised in table 2, we can see that the 
United Kingdom is the only one of these three countries with a well-
developed concentration of therapeutics biotechnology firms (34).   
These data support a number of consulting reports and previous 
academic studies concluding that the UK has Europe’s strongest 
biotechnology sector (see e.g. Senker, 1996; Ernst and Young, 1999; 
Cooke, 1999; Casper and Kettler, 2001).   
 
Neither the German nor Swedish sectors have a critical mass of 
therapeutics biotechnology firms (only three in each country), while 
each has a larger number of platform biotechnology firms.  While 
supporting our expectations, these results could not be considered 
conclusive due to the small number of public biotechnology firms 
existing in Sweden and Germany. We therefore discuss the German 
biotechnology case in more detail below, drawing on a range of 
supplementary statistics that strongly suggest that firms in this 
country have a comparative institutional advantage in platform 
biotechnologies.   
 
Turning to the software cases summarised in table 3, the German 
evidence strongly supports our predictions.  While a relatively large 
number of German software firms are traded on the German stock 
market for growth companies, ninety percent of firms (54 in total) are 
in enterprise software, while there are only three firms in either 
standard software or middleware.  The UK data are also supportive.  
The UK has the largest software industry in Europe and 74 percent of 
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these firms are in “radically innovative” segments, standard software 
or middleware.  This combined with the smaller number of enterprise 
software firms generally supports our predictions.  However, the UK 
case is puzzling in another respect.  Why are most of the UK software 
firms in standard software, with so few in middleware software?   
 
The pattern of Swedish software firm specialisation, on the other 
hand, is problematic.  While a large number of enterprise software 
firms exist (20, or 44% of the total), over half the Swedish software 
firms are in radically innovative areas, and Sweden has Europe’s 
largest concentration of publicly listed middleware firms.  As we will 
discuss in more detail below, the 10 publicly listed middleware firms 
represent only a small percentage of a much larger population of 
recent start-ups in this area.  The Swedish concentration of 
middleware software firms poses a strong challenge to the theoretical 
predictions of this paper; “coordinated market economies” should not 
have a comparative institutional advantage in this area.   
 
Overall, these statistical data, despite limitations, provide good 
support for our theoretical analysis.  Of the 15 cases, 12 could be 
interpreted as confirming our expectations (UK middleware, Swedish 
middleware and standard software being problematic).  For these 
three European economies, the claim that national institutional 
frameworks influence patterns of competitive advantage, and 
specialisation, should be taken seriously.  To further strengthen our 
analysis and also investigate the problematic middleware software 
case, the remainder of the paper examines a smaller number of cases 
in more detail.  Process tracing based on field research, supplemented 
at times by additional descriptive statistics, can help to examine the 
link between institutions and firm organizational strategy more 
sharply. 
 
We focus on two areas.  Firstly, we examine recent developments in 
Germany where the state has, over the last decade, developed an array 
of technology policies designed to spur German industry into the 
types of entrepreneurial technology start-ups discussed here.  These 
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policies, while generally successful in promoting entrepreneurial start-
ups, have convinced few firms to head into “radically innovative” 
market segments characterised by project-based firms. We examine 
this case in more detail, providing richer evidence that German 
entrepreneurial technology firms are almost exclusively clustered in 
subsectors characterised by collaborative firms, despite substantial 
government subsidisation of high-risk venture financing. 
Secondly, we examine the middleware software case in more detail, 
focusing on the Swedish case but with comparisons to Germany and 
the UK.  The technological characteristics of middleware software are 
more complex than standard software due to the importance of 
technical standard coordination across firms.  The activities of large 
firms capable of developing useful technical standards for firms active 
in the sector are crucial in this case and help to explain how Swedish 
firms have become more successful in the middleware software sector 
than UK ones.  We use this case to examine the process by which 
radically innovative technology start-ups have become sustainable 
within a coordinated market economy.  
 
Germany’s Engagement with the “New Economy” 
Beginning in the mid 1990s The German government introduced a 
range of new technology policies designed to create clusters of 
entrepreneurial start-up firms.  Starting in 1996 the government 
decided to provide “public venture capital” in the form of “sleeping” 
or silent equity partnerships from federal sources (see Adelberger 
2000).  Over the past five years well over one billion DM has been 
channelled into such investments, with over half of the new firms 
specialising in information technology, communications, or 
biotechnology.  German public officials have crafted a dense network 
of support policies for university-centred spin-offs. This includes 
funding the creation of several technology parks and incubator labs, 
hiring of consultants to persuade university professors or their 
students to commercialise their research findings and help them 
design viable business plans, subsidies to help defray the costs of 
patenting their intellectual property, and the provision of management 
consulting and partnering activities once new firms are founded.  The 
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programs have concentrated on biotechnology, but recently have been 
extended into other sectors including software (Lehrer, 2000).   
  
Government support has dramatically reduced the financial risk of 
founding an entrepreneurial technology firm in Germany.  The 
“public venture capital” program has spurred a dramatic increase in 
private venture capital.  The structure of Germany’s venture capital 
market has dramatically improved over the course of the late 1990s.  
Total venture funding rose from about 9 billion DM in 1996 to 25 
billion available in 1999 (German Venture Capital Association, 1999).  
At only 400 million DM in 1999, federal funds formed less than five 
percent of the total sum of venture capital then available in Germany.  
Private sector investments in new financial markets, coupled with 
supportive financial regulatory reforms, also help explain the creation 
of large venture capital markets in Germany.  The cornerstone of 
these initiatives was the creation in 1997 of a new technology oriented 
stock exchange, the Neuer Markt, with substantially less burdensome 
listing requirements than those that exist for the main stock market.  
As of December 2000, about 270 firms had taken initial public 
offerings on the Neuer Markt.   By providing a viable “exit-option” to 
investors in technology start-ups, the Neuer Markt has created a 
financial environment more conducive to high-risk venture capital 
investments despite its recent price falls.     
 
Given the relative ease of obtaining VC finance and, particularly for 
biotechnology firms, fairly sophisticated infrastructure support within 
low-rent start-up incubators, it is it not surprising that hundreds of 
new start-up firms have been founded in Germany.  However, the vast 
majority of these firms are specialised in platform biotechnologies.   
In an initial survey of over 300 German biotechnology firms 
conducted in 1998, managers were asked to list the areas of their 
research activities.  Therapeutics came in fifth, ranked well below 
contract research and manufacturing, platform technologies, 
diagnostics, and “other services.” (Schitag Ernst and Young, 1998: 
17). A more recent survey published in late 2001 examined the 
number of therapeutic products developed across European 
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biotechnology companies.  This survey found that the UK companies 
had 128 products in development, compared to only six for Germany 
(Ernst and Young, 2001). 
 
An analysis of the technological intensity of German biotechnology 
patents strongly supports the notion that German firms have 
specialised in sub-sectors with high cumulativeness.  Figure 1 
examines the average number of scientific journals referenced in 
German and US patents from 1985 until 1998.  This is a rough 
indicator of technical cumulativeness – the greater the number of 
basic research citations in a patent application, the “newer” or less 
cumulative on previous discoveries the innovation may be presumed 
to be.  These figures show that the average number of US scientific 
references in 1998 (about 24) is about three times as many in 
Germany (about 8), with the gap widening substantially over the 
19990s.  This finding complements evidence that German firms have 
specialised in sub-sectors of biotechnology firms with technological 
characteristics that are generally more cumulative in nature.   
 
Turning to the software industry, German companies are 
overwhelmingly specialised in enterprise software markets.  Most 
German software firms were founded during the 1980s to help fuel 
the corporate enterprise software markets; the average age across the 
60 public firms is 15.3 years.  Examples of prominent segments 
include enterprise resource planning (4 of the publicly listed firms), 
customer relationship management (5 firms), systems integration (7 
firms), and a variety of sector-specific enterprise tools in areas such as 
logistics and supply chain management (9 firms).   
 
There is only one cluster of German publicly traded software firms 
that is relatively young – a group of 7 firms active in the e-commerce 
software field (average age 7.4 years as of May 2001; Casper, 2002).  
This group of firms has received substantial private venture capital 
funding, facilitating much faster growth before initial public offerings.  
Rather than relying on “organic” driven growth based on earnings, 
they have had the opportunity to invest lavishly to create large 
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organizational structures in an attempt to quickly grab substantial 
market shares. A closer examination of this sub-sector reveals 
complex organizational structures and relatively incremental 
innovation patterns characteristic for new technology enterprises in 
Germany. 
 
E-commerce software is one of the only core Internet infrastructure 
areas in which German firms have established substantial market 
share in non-German language markets.  While American firms 
dominate several segments, particularly in the provision of software 
for “business to business” transactions, German firms are 
internationally competitive in the provision of software to facilitate 
on-line retailing (“business to consumer” ecommerce) and are also 
strong in creating secure-transaction software for on-line financial 
transactions (see Casper, 2002). 
 
Business concepts underlying e-commerce software resemble those 
pioneered by the German firm SAP to create the Enterprise Resource 
Planning market..  E-commerce software firms develop customisable 
software modules designed to help client firms organise e-commerce 
platforms.  The business model involves the creation and updating of 
a kernel of e-commerce applications – inventory tracking, accounting, 
order completion, as well as the creation of visual web-interfaces used 
by customers – which are typically installed and extensively 
customised by the software provider or third party software 
consultancies.   
 
While e-commerce software firms may compete to introduce software 
with enhanced functionality, especially in the “ease of use” area, the 
software itself is relatively generic.  E-commerce software platforms 
are proprietary systems completely owned and maintained by the 
developer.  Patenting over core e-commerce processes appears weak; 
dozens of e-commerce software firms exist, most of which offer 
relatively similar technologies.  To reduce these appropriability 
concerns, firms invest in a core proprietary library of programs that 
are then customised for clients during extensive implementation 
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programs.  Doing so creates a lock-in effect for the software vendor, 
and can also help capture rents from periodic “up-grade” cycles as the 
software is improved.  
 
Germany’s e-commerce software specialists resemble most German 
firms in developing human resource policies that are broadly 
competence enhancing in nature.  Firms usually organise a group of 
programmers with advanced degrees who update the core software 
platform, along with a much larger group of trained technicians and 
consultants involved in implementation and service issues. 
Proprietary programming environments tend to keep competence 
destruction low – new programmers may be added to accommodate 
inevitable “feature creep”, but existing staff have high job security 
due to the need to periodically update the code.  Relatively complex 
coordination across teams of programmers and technicians involved 
in customisation and implementation work is key to competitive 
success. 
 
In summary, in both biotechnology and software small German 
growth companies have gravitated away from segments with radical 
innovation and related competence destroying risks. The German 
pattern of sub-sector specialisation in the biotechnology and software 
sectors strongly suggests that, while changing, the German model has 
not converged to a “liberal market economy” system capable of 
supporting project-based entrepreneurial technology firms.  To some 
commentators, particularly in the business and consulting community 
(see e.g. Ernst and Young, 2001), this pattern of specialisation 
represents a failure of German technology policy to alter the structure 
of the economy radically.  
 
Indeed, outside the financial area, there have been no major reforms 
to German labour or company laws.  Rapid hiring and firing continues 
to be difficult in Germany.  Long-term employment strategies by 
large firms limit the development of labour markets for high quality 
staff.  While large German firms can sell entire subsidiaries or 
business units or send some lower-productivity older employees into 
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early retirement, codetermination law makes it difficult for firms to 
lay-off individual employees or groups of employees as part of the 
“normal” course of business (see Becker et. al., 1999 for a discussion 
of Hoechst’s difficulties in this area).  Seen in terms of career 
structure, there is a high risk for senior managers and researchers in 
moving from an established large company or prestigious university 
professorship to a start-up firm.   
 
This constraint-based argument ignores the fact that several of 
Germany’s new economy firms have been successful, capturing 
international markets for important biotechnology platform 
technologies and specialised e-commerce and related enterprise 
software.   Rather than viewing German developments as a case of 
failed technology policy in the face of institutional constraints, we 
would argue that German firms have specialised in areas of the new 
economy in which they have a comparative institutional advantage.    
 
If the long term development of platform biotechnology and 
enterprise software firms does create substantial amounts of risk 
created by a weak appropriability regime, high cumulativeness, and 
high knowledge complexity, then it is likely that German institutional 
environments could allow more efficient governance structures to 
cope with these problems within collaborative firm structures.   
German national institutional frameworks continue to encourage 
competence enhancing human resource development through 
restraints on hire and fire that facilitate long-term employment.   
Access to a superior institutional environment could lead to German 
firms eventually outperforming firms located within liberal market 
economies in areas where complex organizational structures are 
important.   
 
Sweden’s Surprising Performance in Middleware Software 
Stylised contrasts between CMEs and LMEs need to be further 
elaborated when considering sectors where different kinds of 
knowledge and specifications need to be coordinated in the 
development of new technological systems. Under some 
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circumstances large firms can act as de facto coordinating agents in 
CMEs and encourage the development of radically innovative firms in 
societies that otherwise would not be expected to support them. We 
now turn to consider firm development in such a sector, middleware 
software production.   
 
The technological characteristics of middleware software are more 
complex than standard software, due to the importance of technical 
standard coordination across firms. This depends upon the resolution 
of collective action dilemmas that are difficult for numerous small 
firms to resolve, particularly when distributive issues hinge on the 
particular constellation of technical knowledge chosen (Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999).  In addition to human resource policy risks created by 
high competence destruction, middleware software firms face an 
additional coordination risk created by uncertainty about which 
emerging standards in a firm’s chosen technical field will succeed.  
 
Though governments have at times played important roles within 
telecommunication standards (see Glimstedt, 2001), within much of 
the middleware software sector most firms are dependent upon large 
corporations, typically telecommunication equipment manufacturers 
and established companies active in network intensive standard 
software products, for the provision of standards to help products 
become interoperable (see Casper and Glimstedt 2001). Examples of 
the former include large network equipment manufacturers such as 
Cisco Systems, Lucent, or Ericsson, while Microsoft, Sun, or Oracle 
exemplify the latter.  Each of these firms has been involved in the 
creation of technology platforms for emerging network 
communication markets.  These firms hope to provide technology 
platforms that function as “club goods” to middleware software 
companies, enticing them to develop a variety of follow-on 
technologies aimed at eventually creating new software platforms.   
Large firms are self-interested when providing these standards – 
through controlling emerging network communication protocols, they 
hope to secure large markets for equipment and software using the 
standards. 




Large firms can help stabilise technologies through attracting 
middleware firms to create applications for their standards.  As a 
result, middleware software firms are most likely to exist within 
technology clusters dominated by large companies that can entice 
them to commit to a technical standard, either through a reputation of 
past success or through other means such as financial incentives or 
technical support. Through locating within regional economies 
dominated by such firms, middleware firms can plausibly hope to 
insert its software engineers into emerging technical communities 
surrounding new platforms.  Privileged access to such communities 
can provide a competitive advantage for middleware firms, through 
for example supplementing codified technical knowledge (protocols, 
languages) with tacit knowledge surrounding their efficiency or, at 
times, through securing quicker access to emerging technological 
platforms. 
 
In sum, the existence of a firm that can credibly coordinate technical 
standards can help lower technical coordination risks, though high 
levels of technical and market uncertainty remain.  This suggests that 
middleware firms existing with liberal market economies that are 
home to dominant technology firms should excel in creating clusters 
of middleware firms.  The United States, for example, is a clear 
example of a country that has both.  Large concentrations of 
middleware firms exist in the Silicon Valley and New Jersey areas, in 
part due to the existence of several firms dominant in setting network 
infrastructure standards  (e.g. Lucent and Cisco in the 
telecommunications area, Microsoft, Sun, and Oracle in the recently 
emerging network services area). 
 
Within the three European economies examined here, our example of 
a LME, the UK, is not home to a dominant network technology firm 
(its core telecommunications equipment manufacturer, Marconi, is 
widely seen as failing to succeed in “broadband” internet equipment 
markets).  This helps to explain why so few UK firms are in 
middleware technology, but are more successful in standard software.  
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The UK is home to technology clusters that are embedded within the 
type of labour markets needed to facilitate flexible forms of human 
resource coordination but does not have a hegemonic network 
communications player capable of sponsoring emerging middleware 
software standards.  UK software firms have instead gravitated to 
standard software segments, for which technical intensity remains 
high, but inter-firm coordination is low. 
 
Germany is a clearer case.  It is also not home to a dominant 
technology provider (Siemens is strong in some equipment markets, 
but is not a leader in promoting new telecommunications standards; 
see Casper, 2002), nor does it have a business system conducive to 
the creation of flexible labour markets.  For this case, it is 
overdetermined that the governance of middleware software firms 
should be difficult. More interesting are CMEs that are home to 
dominant technology firms.   
 
Within Sweden, for instance, Ericsson’s current leadership in third 
generation wireless technologies has helped create a technology hub 
in the Stockholm area that has a technological intensity far more 
similar to Silicon Valley than normal patterns of industrial 
organization in Sweden.  Ericsson has become the dominant provider 
of end-to-end wireless communication systems, and currently has 
about 40% of all orders for third generation wireless equipment.   
Other major telecommunications equipment players such as Nokia 
have set up development centres in Stockholm, and Microsoft recently 
opened a R&D centre for wireless software.  Hundreds of software 
firms focusing primarily on wireless Internet technologies have 
developed in the Stockholm area of Sweden.  A recent survey showed 
that around 250 wireless firms are active in Sweden, most in 
technically intensive middleware technologies (see Glimstedt and 
Zander, 2002).   
 
We will use this case to examine the interplay between human 
resource coordination and technology coordination.  The key issue 
here is: what constellation of policies must the large firm take to 
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induce engineers, managers, and financiers to make commitments to 
projects that are normally extremely risky within their societal 
contexts?  Can dominant actors take actions to “tip” labour market 
institutions in a direction contrary to “normal” institutional incentives 
with an economy?   
 
We focus here on two factors: a) the influence of technology 
standards in fostering a switch from firm specific to more generic, 
industry-specific technical skill-sets among software engineers, and b) 
initiatives taken by Ericsson to foster entrepreneurialism surrounding 
technologies it is sponsoring.  From the perspective of human 
resource coordination, these factors have reduced the career risk of 
working in a radically innovative technology start-up, and through 
doing so allow competence destroying firm strategies to become 
sustainable.   
  
Ericsson through the 1980s and early 1990s in many ways resembled 
Siemens, Alcatel, and other European telecommunication equipment 
manufacturers.  Operating as a quasi-monopoly equipment provider in 
a highly regulated domestic telecommunication markets, it developed 
large systems integration capabilities needed to design early digital 
switching technologies designed primarily for voice-traffic in-house.  
As the only significant telecommunications equipment manufacturer 
in Sweden, it could attract the country’s best engineering graduates, 
who were then offered stable, long-term careers in Ericsson.  The 
company developed proprietary protocols and systems integration 
languages.  The core of Ericsson’s programming staff, for example, 
were experts in Ericsson’s in-house systems integration language, 
Plex, a computer language used nowhere else.  While the convergence 
of data-communication and voice-based digital communication 
technology has forced Ericsson to adopt new languages for its next 
generation telecommunications gear, several thousand employees 
have been retained for their expertise in Plex, which is still used to 
update legacy equipment. 
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During the late 1990s data-communication networking devices have 
begun to converge with traditional telecommunication switching 
equipment.  The increased use of Internet Protocol based switching 
has forced firms like Ericsson to increasingly adopt connectivity 
standards developed for data-communications networks.  The issue 
for such firms is how this influences product development and 
systems integration issues internally.  In designing switching 
equipment, base tower systems, and related artefacts for its internet-
compatible wireless equipment, a small group of system engineers 
within Ericsson developed a new systems integration language, called 
Erlang.  As with Plex, Ericsson’s initial strategy was to make this 
technology proprietary.   
 
However, unlike Plex, Erlang is a systems development language 
based on relatively standardised object-oriented programming tools 
with the potential to help firms in a number of industries develops 
software to manage complex technological systems.  Upset at 
Ericsson’s move to keep Erlang proprietary, the chief developer of 
Erlang along with a group of systems programmers left Ericsson in 
1999 to form an independent start-up software company called 
Bluetail (Glimstedt and Zander, 2002). 
 
Around the same time as this personnel crisis, Ericsson faced 
important strategic decisions regarding its sponsorship of wireless 
connectivity standards.  Through its strong advocacy of the GSM 
standard, Ericsson management learned that, in relatively open data-
communication network architectures, network externalities play a 
crucial role in determining which network standards become dominate 
(see Glimstedt, 2001).  Ericsson was a major sponsor and developer 
of two important new web-based wireless connectivity standards, 
WAP and Bluetooth.  The firm realised that if these standards were to 
succeed, dozens of other firms would have to work with these 
standards, creating unique applications software and middleware 
technology.  Through creating large marketplaces for various wireless 
applications, demand for Ericsson’s core end-to-end wireless systems 
technology would increase.  Nurturing nascent wireless technology 
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start-ups in the Stockholm area would help enhance Ericsson’s 
favoured technologies.   
 
To help promote technology spillovers into the Stockholm economy, 
Ericsson made two strategic moves.  First, in decided to make Erlang 
an “open source” development language, it allowed the founders of 
Bluetail as well as other firms to use Erlang as a development tool.  In 
this case, using open source development protocols ensures that 
enhancements to Erlang by third parties would flow back into 
Ericsson.   More importantly, however, it helped to create industry-
specific rather than firm-specific skills among engineers involved in 
large-scale systems integration.  Sponsorship of emerging wireless 
connectivity standards such as Bluetooth and WAP or widely used 
mobile scripting languages like UML produces a similar effect.     
Standardisation of development tools, protocols, and connectivity 
standards dramatically increases the portability of skills across local 
firms working in wireless technology areas.   
 
Secondly, Ericsson has changed its personnel policy towards 
engineers who leave to work in start-up firms.  It had formerly 
strongly shunned engineers leaving long-term careers at Ericsson to 
work elsewhere, signalling that they would not be re-employed by 
Ericsson in the future.   Through creating a corporate venture capital 
program, it now allows engineers leaving Ericsson to try their hand at 
technology entrepreneurialism.  Given that most wireless start-ups 
within the Stockholm area are involved in the development of 
Ericsson-sponsored standards, and in many cases are using its core 
systems development language, local start-up ventures are working 
primarily to develop technologies compatible with Ericsson’s next 
generation wireless technologies.  If individual firms fail, their 
managers can now easily return to work within Ericsson, perhaps 
having developed new managerial skills or career perspectives 
through working in a start-up.  If start-up firms are successful, 
Ericsson benefits through its sponsorship of key technologies and has 
close links with the management of the new companies. 
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In sum, the existence of industry rather than firm-specific standards 
reduces the career risk for engineers leaving established large firms 
for start-ups.  Industry specific standards ensure that skill and 
knowledge investments made by programmers and engineers are 
portable.  It allows managers of high-tech firms to successfully recruit 
highly skilled technical talent knowing that competence destruction 
and accompanying hire and fire risks are high.  This combined with a 
more open human resource policy at Ericsson helps explain the rapid 
emergence of numerous radically innovative firms.  Within normally 
conservative Swedish labour markets, this employment insurance is a 
key catalyst for creating extremely active labour markets necessary to 
sustain competence destroying technology strategies.  
 
Conclusions   
By focusing on the characteristics of different sub-sectors in this 
paper we have attempted to show how institutional frameworks 
structure distinctive strategies and organisational capabilities of firms 
in a more precise manner than much institutional theory.  Institutional 
explanations associated with the “varieties of capitalism” literature 
strongly predict that the diffusion of entrepreneurial patterns of 
organising technology firms should differ across European 
economies.  Both descriptive statistics on sub-sector specialisation 
and more qualitative case analysis suggest that the concept of 
comparative institutional advantage helps to explain patterns by which 
new technologies are developing in Europe.   
 
One contribution of this analysis is to demonstrate that European 
economies can perform well in emerging technology industries such 
as biotechnology and software.  These economies do so, however, not 
by radically altering institutional frameworks to mimic the US liberal 
economy model, but by seeking sub-segments within these segments 
in which firms can embrace long-standing comparative institutional 
advantage.  Evidence presented in this paper has documented the 
existence of important sub-sectors, such as high quality platform 
biotechnologies and enterprise software, in which patterns of 
company organization and related business strategy need to develop 
  32 
 
  
complex organizational structures focused on competence enhancing 
human resource management.  Firms within coordinated market 
economies such as Germany or Sweden have specialised in these 
technologies not as a “second best” solution, but because the 
institutional organization of these business systems create institutional 
advantages in resolving the managerial dilemmas that characterise 
these sub-sectors. 
 
An implication of this analysis is that trade-offs exist in designing 
policies intended to foster entrepreneurial technology firms.  Because 
different types of technology firms differ in their core organization, 
their optimal governance requires their embeddedness in different 
innovation systems.  Thus, while the US has a large lead in fostering 
new technology firms, as key technological drivers diffuse through 
the international economy, one can expect that a division of labour 
will emerge cross nationally.  While institutions associated with the 
US (and UK) innovation systems support business models demanding 
extreme flexibility (and competence destruction), Germany, Sweden, 
and other “organised” economies might promote superior innovation 
dynamics in areas dominated more by business integration and 
appropriability risks.   
 
The focus on sub-sectors also sheds light on the organization of more 
“radically innovative” technological segments such as therapeutics 
biotechnology, standard software, and middleware software.  Our 
analysis chimes with a number of important studies of the institutional 
organization of high-technology regions such as Silicon Valley 
(Saxenian, 1994; Kenney, 2000; Almeida and Kogut, 1999).  We 
share with these studies the suggestion that low technological 
cumulativeness and resulting competence destruction across clusters 
of new technology start-ups can be facilitated by the creation of 
extremely fluid labour markets within regional economies.  While 
most studies of Silicon Valley and related technology clusters have a 
regional focus, we focus primarily on broader national institutional 
frameworks that structure patterns of coordination across particular 
sectors and regions within the economy.  Doing so helps explain 
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broad differences in technological specialisation across economies, 
but cannot explain the relatively rare development of regional 
economies capable of fostering high levels of technological intensity 
across start-up firms within particular economies.  In other words, 
there are more “degrees of freedom” between the orientation of 
national institutional frameworks and the ability of managers across 
groups of firms to develop innovative competencies than is suggested 
by varieties of capitalism theory. 
 
Linking insights from varieties of capitalism research with the 
emerging literature on regional technology clusters is an important 
area for future research.  A firm-centred approach, focused on 
relatively stable constellations of organizational and strategic 
dilemmas faced by managers across particular sub-sectors, can help 
push this agenda forward.  Our analysis of the Swedish middleware 
software case is a first step in this direction.  This case shows that 
institutions are not the only mechanism by which human resource 
coordination across firms can be overcome.  In sectors in which 
external coordination with other firms is important, the activities of 
large firms might override “normal” institutional framework 
conditions.  Due to a close linkage between standards used to 
coordinate technological trajectories across firms and the 
development of particular skill-sets among scientists and engineers, 
successful standards stewardship by telecommunications giants such 
as Ericsson has helped to reduce the competence destruction risks 
faced by personnel choosing to work in middleware software firms in 
normally conservative labour markets.  Exploring this link between 
institutional environments, large firm strategy, and the development 
of entrepreneurial technology firms is an important topic for future 
research.    
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TABLE 1: EXPECTED SUCCESS OF THREE EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 
IN FIVE TECHNOLOGICALLY DYNAMIC SUBSECTORS 
 




Successful Successful  Unsuccessful 
Enterprise 
software 
Successful Successful  Unsuccessful 
Standard 
Software 
Unsuccessful Unsuccessful Successful 
Therapeutics 
biotechnology 
Unsuccessful  Unsuccessful Successful   
Middleware 
software 







TABLE 2: SUB-SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 
COMPANIES 
 
 Germany  United  Kingdom  Sweden 
 Number  Percent  Number  Percent Number Percent 
Platform 
Biotechnologies 






3 19  34  85  3  37 
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TABLE 3: SUB-SECTOR DISTRIBUTION OF SOFTWARE COMPANIES 
 
 
 Germany  United  Kingdom  Sweden 
 Number  Percent  Number  Percent Number Percent 
Enterprise 
Software 
54 90  23  26  20  44 
Standard 
Software 
3 5  58  66  16  34 
Middleware 
Software 
3 5  7  8  10  22 





















































Adelberger, K. E., (2000), “Semi-Sovereign Leadership? The State's Role in 
German Biotechnology and Venture Capital Growth”, German Politics,  
9: 103-122. 
Almeida, Paul and Bruce Kogut (1999), "Localization of Knowledge and the 
Mobility of Engineers in Regional Networks," Management Science. 45, 
905-917. 
Arthur, Brian, 1994 Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Economy. 
Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Breschi, S. and F. Malerba (1997), “Sectoral Innovation Systems: Technological 
Regimes, Schumpeterian Dynamics, and Spatial Boundaries”, in C. 
Edquist ed., Systems of Innovation: Technologies, Institutions and 
Organizations, London: Pinter, 130-155. 
Baldwin C. And K. Clark. (1997), ”Managing in the Age of Modularity”, 
Harvard Business Review, September-October: 84-93. 
Bahrami, H. and S. Evans, (1995), “Flexible Re-cycling and High-Technology 
Entrepreneurship”, California Management Review 37: 62-88. 
Casper, Steven (2000) “Institutional Adaptiveness, Technology Policy, and the 
Diffusion of New Business Models: The Case of German Biotechnology” 
Organization Studies 21: 887-914. 
Casper, Steven (2002), ”The German Internet Economy and the Silicon Valley 
Model: Convergence, Divergence, or Something Else?”, in B. Kogut (ed) 
The Global Internet Economy, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. 
Casper, Steven and H. Glimstedt, (2001), “Economic Organization, Innovation 
Systems, and the Internet. Oxford Review of Economic Policy”, 17. 265-
281. 
Casper, S., M. Lehrer and D. Soskice, (1999),  “Can High-Technology 
Industries Prosper in Germany: Institutional Frameworks and the 
Evolution of the German Software and Biotechnology Industries”, 
Industry and Innovation 6: 6-23. 
Casper, S. and S. Vitols, (2002), “Managing Competencies within 
Entrepreneurial  Technologies: A Comparative Institutional Analysis of 
Software Firms in Germany and the United Kingdom”, Working Paper, 
Judge Institute of Management, Cambridge University. 
Cooke Phillip (1999) “Biotechnology Clusters in the UK: Lessons from 
Localisation in the Commercialisation of Science.” Centre for Advanced 
Studies, Cardiff University, Cardiff 
Deutsche Bundesbank (1998) Monthly Report, April. 
Dosi, G. (1988), “Sources, Procedures, and Microeconomic Effects of 
Innovation,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 26, No. 3., pp. 1120-
1171. 
  37 
 
  
Ernst & Young (2001) European Life Sciences 2001, London: Ernst & Young 
International 
Ernst & Young (1999) European Life Sciences 1999, London: Ernst & Young 
International.  
Gambardella, Alfonso (1995) Science and Innovation: The US pharmaceutical 
industry during the 1980s, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
German Venture Capital Association (1999) “Venture Capital in Europe 
1998”, Special Report, July 9.  
Glimstedt, H. (2001), “Competitive Dynamics of Technological 
Standardization: The Case of Third Generation Cellular 
Communications”, Industry and Innovation 8: 49-78. 
Glimstedt, H. and U. Zander, (2002), “Sweden’s Wireless Wonders: Defining 
the Swedish Internet Economy”, in B. Kogut, ed., The Global Internet 
Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Hall, Peter and David Soskice, 2001. “Introduction” in Peter Hall and David 
          Soskice ed. Varieties of Capitalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Henderson, R., L. Orsenigo, and G. Pisano, (1999), “The Pharmaceutical 
Industry and the Revolution in Molecular Biology: Interactions Among 
Scientific, Institutional and Organizational Change” in David Mowery 
and Richard Nelson, ed. Sources of Industrial Leadership (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press), pp. 267-311. 
Katzenstein, Peter (1989) “Stability and Change in the Emerging Third 
Republic”, in Katzenstein, P. ed. Industry and Politics in West Germany, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Kenney, M., ed., (2000), Understanding Silicon Valley: The Anatomy of an 
Entrepreneurial Region, Palo Alto: Stanford University Press. 
King, D. and S. Wood, (1999) “The Political Economy of Neoliberalism: 
Britain and the United States in the 19890s.” In Continuity and Change in 
Contemporary Capitalism, ed. H. Kitschelt et al. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press., pp. 371-91. 
Kitschelt, H (1991) “Industrial Governance, Innovation Strategies, and the Case 
of Japan: Sectoral Governance or Cross-national Comparative Analysis?”  
International Organization 45: 453-493. 
Kogut, B. ed., (2002), The Global Internet Economy, Cambridge: MIT Press. 
Lehrer, Mark, (2000), “Has Germany Finally Solved Its High-Tech Problem? 
The Recent Boom in German Technolology-based Entrepreneurism,” 
California Management Review 42: 89-107. 
Malerba, F., and L. Orsenigo, (1993), “Technological Regimes and Firm 
Behaviour”, Industrial and Corporate Change 2, 45-71. 
Miller, Gary, (1992), Managerial Dilemmas, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
  38 
 
  
Monks, Robert and Neil Minow (1995) Corporate governance, London: 
Blackwell 
Nooteboom, Bart (2000) "Institutions and Forms of Cooperation," Organization 
Studies, 21. 915-940. 
Penan, Hervé (1996) “R&D Strategy in a Techno-Economic Network:   
Alzheimer’s Disease Therapeutic Strategies”, Research Policy, Vol. 25, 
337-358 
Perrow, C., (1985), Normal Accidents, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
Pontusson, J. and P. Swenson (1996). “Labour Markets, Production Strategies, 
and Wage Bargaining Institutions: The Swedish Employer Offensive in 
Comparative Perspective.” Comparative Political Studies, v. 29, 223-50 
Rabinow, P. (1996). Making PCR: A Story of Biotechnology. Chicago: 
Universityof Chicago Press 
Saxenian, A., (1994), Regional Advantage, Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press. 
Schitag Ernst & Young (1998a) Germany’s Biotechnology Takes Off in 1998, 
Stuttgart: Schitag Ernst & Young. 
Senker, Jacqueline (1996) “National Systems of Innovation, Organizational 
Learning and Industrial Biotechnology”, Technovation, Vol. 16, 219-229. 
Shapiro, C. and H. Varian, (1999) Information Rules, Cambridge: HBS Press 
Soskice, D., (1999), “Divergent Production Regimes: Coordinated and 
Uncoordinated Market Economies in the 1980s and 1990s.” In Continuity 
and Change in Contemporary Capitalism, ed. H. Kitschelt et al. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
Soskice, D., (1997), “German Technology Policy, Innovation, and National 
Institutional Frameworks,” Industry and Innovation, 4: 75-96.  
Streeck, Wolfgang (1984)  Industrial Relations in West Germany: A Case Study 
of the Car Industry. New York: St. Martin’s Press.  
Teece, D., (1986), “Profiting from Technological Innovation: Implications for 
Integration, Collaboration, Licensing, and Public Policy, Research Policy 
15: 285-305. 
Thelen, K. (1993), “West European Labor in Transition: Sweden and Germany 
Compared.” World Politics, Vol. 46, 23-49. 
Werth, Barry (1994) The Billion-Dollar Molecule. New York: Touchstone, 
Simon & Schuster. 
Whitley, Richard  (1999) Divergent capitalisms: The social structuring and 
change of business systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Whitley, Richard (2000) "The Institutional Structuring of Innovation 
Strategies,"Organization Studies. 21. 855-886  
Whitley, Richard (2002) "Developing Innovative Competences: The role of 
 institutional  frameworks,"  Industrial and Corporate Change. 
  39 
 
  
  40 
 
 
Winter, S. (1987), “Knowledge and competence as strategic assets,” in D. J. 
Teece ed., The Competitive Challenge: Strategies for Industrial 
Innovation and Renewal,  Cambridge,   MA: Ballinger. 
Wood, S. (2001), “Business, Government, and Patterns of Labor Market Policy in Britain and 
the Federal Republic of Germany,” in P. Hall and D. Soskice ed. Varieties of 
Capitalism, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 247-274. 
Zucker, L. , M. Darby and M. Brewer, (1997), “Intellectual Human Capital and 
the Birth of U.S. Biotechnology Enterprises”, American Economic 
Review, Vol. 87(3). 
 